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Security Model

Identity, Isolation, Verification & Execution Integrity

Forge Pool is designed to operate across partially trusted and fully untrusted hardware environments.

Security is enforced structurally — not optionally.

This document outlines the core security architecture.


1. Threat Model

Forge Pool assumes:

  • Agents may be malicious
  • Agents may be faulty
  • Hardware may produce inconsistent results
  • Network environments may be hostile
  • Clients may misconfigure workloads
  • Tokens may be compromised
  • Economic incentives may create attack surfaces

The system is designed so that:

  • no single Agent can define execution truth
  • no execution result depends on a single machine
  • deterministic aggregation prevents silent corruption
  • identity boundaries isolate authority

Security is based on minimization of trust.


2. Identity vs Authority

Forge Pool separates identity types:

User Identity

  • Managed in HQ
  • Role-based permissions
  • Controls Studio and project access

API Keys (Client Identity)

  • Project-scoped
  • Rate limited
  • Revocable
  • Used for Kernel execution calls

Node Tokens (Provider Identity)

  • Organization-scoped
  • Bound to billing ledger
  • Revocable
  • Required for Agent authentication

Cryptographic Agent Identity

Each Agent generates:

  • ed25519 keypair
  • Public key registered with Hub
  • Signed execution responses

Tokens authenticate. Keys verify integrity.

Authority is never shared across identity classes.


3. Trust Boundaries

Forge Pool defines explicit trust zones:

ComponentRoleTrust Assumption
HQControl PlaneTrusted
Web CorePolicy & BillingTrusted
HubDeterministic OrchestratorTrusted
AgentsExecution WorkersUntrusted
Memory FabricControlled StorageTrusted (configurable)

Agents are considered untrusted executors.

Verification exists because Agents are not trusted by default.


4. Execution Integrity Model

Security in Forge Pool centers on deterministic execution integrity.

Enforced mechanisms:

  • deterministic shard planning
  • seed-controlled randomness
  • deterministic reduction
  • shard result hashing
  • optional shard duplication
  • verification routing

If an Agent returns corrupted results:

  • deterministic aggregation exposes inconsistency
  • verification shards detect divergence
  • health score adjusts
  • scheduling priority reduces

Integrity is enforced structurally.


5. Shard Isolation

Agents:

  • receive shard-only context
  • do not access full job payload
  • do not access other shard outputs
  • cannot inspect organization secrets
  • cannot access billing ledger

Each shard is executed in isolation.

Agents are incapable of:

  • modifying other shards
  • influencing aggregation logic
  • altering replay metadata

6. Secure Communication

Transport security includes:

  • HTTPS (TLS) for client API
  • QUIC/TLS for Hub ↔ Agent
  • Authenticated NATS channels (if enabled)
  • Signed shard results

All communication is encrypted in transit.

Hub validates:

  • token authenticity
  • signature integrity
  • job binding

7. Secret Handling

Clients

  • API keys must be stored securely
  • Never embed in client-side code
  • Rotate periodically

Agents

  • NODE_TOKEN stored in .env
  • Not exposed via API
  • Requires restart for rotation

Studio

  • Uses server-side session
  • Does not persist sensitive tokens in browser storage

Secret scope is minimal.


8. Verification Modes

Verification is policy-controlled:

  • none
  • sample
  • full

Verification may include:

  • shard duplication
  • cross-agent comparison
  • statistical validation
  • result hash comparison

Verification reduces risk of:

  • malicious nodes
  • faulty hardware
  • silent corruption

9. Replay & Audit Security

Jobs are immutable after completion.

Replay requires:

  • identical Kernel contract
  • identical seed
  • identical workload version

Replay guarantees:

  • auditability
  • forensic reproducibility
  • regulatory defensibility

Replay metadata is cryptographically bound to job.


10. Economic Attack Mitigation

Forge Pool mitigates:

  • fake node inflation
  • result manipulation for credit farming
  • verification bypass attempts
  • shard withholding

Mitigation mechanisms:

  • health scoring
  • verification participation tracking
  • shard correctness scoring
  • scheduling weight adjustments
  • billing tied to validated output

Economic incentives align with correctness.


11. Isolation Between Environments

Nodes may be configured for:

  • PUBLIC global workloads
  • PRIVATE organization-only workloads

Enterprise deployments may include:

  • private Hub
  • private Studio
  • restricted node pools
  • network segmentation
  • air-gapped compute clusters

Isolation is configurable at deployment layer.


12. Token Rotation & Revocation

Best practices:

  • rotate API keys periodically
  • rotate Node Tokens on hardware changes
  • revoke unused credentials immediately

Revocation is immediate and enforced at next connection.


13. Enterprise Security Model

For high-security institutions:

  • dedicated private Hubs
  • restricted region routing
  • hardened node allowlists
  • custom verification policies
  • audit logging exports
  • deterministic replay archival

Forge Pool supports institutional-grade security posture.


Security Philosophy

Forge Pool does not assume trust.

It assumes potential failure.

Security emerges from:

  • deterministic structure
  • cryptographic identity
  • isolation boundaries
  • verification enforcement
  • replay integrity

Execution truth must be defensible.

Security is structural, not procedural.